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Abstract
I investigate the semantic and practical complexity of social rights, together with the obligations which correspond to the public authorities in terms of putting them into practice. I
also discuss the role of meaningful economic equality in the discourse of social rights,
explaining the points at which the two concepts interact, and the ways that formal equality
can be improved. Finally, I reach the conclusion that there are two distinct meanings of the
concept of discrimination, one which is equivalent to any violation of the general principal
of equality, and another stricter one, which is the infringement of equality when any of the
proscribed differentiating factors are present (race, sex, etc.). The legal aspect of the mandate to exercise and guarantee social rights is manifest in the programmed objective, as well
as in the fact that the measures aimed at this objective are protected from the possibility of
compliance.
In this way, social rights constitute subjective rights, representing a programme through
which goods would be distributed evenly among public, collective and private interests.
This results in a singular structure with a special mechanism by which the State has to provide assistance and services, and create, strengthen and promote the conditions allowing
individuals and groups to satisfy their needs. Thus their obligations are also related to the
prerequisites for exercising positive liberty. The main point of departure is that individuals
are moral subjects endowed with dignity. It defends the idea that we all have real capacity
for choice and that we all direct our existence towards certain aims in life.
Keywords
social rights, liberty, equality

1. A Starting Point: Some Challenges of Social Rights
Indeed, with changes that have taken place, the liberal paradigm now considers that members of a society are actors in a market economy which
*) Consolider-Ingenio 2010. The Age of the Rights. CSD2008-00007.
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guarantees the real conditions ensuring individual rights. Thus the recognition of an individual right represents the exercise of private autonomy by
the stipulation of contracts and the acquisition of goods or services from
others. In this kind of State, the structure of rights assumes that women,
racial minorities, gays, the disabled etc., fit into the present scheme for
‘natural’ reasons, without taking into account the underlying problem.1
The process of transformation takes shape in a number of forms: the move
from formal competence towards substantive content; the use of ‘recognition rules’ and ‘fundamental and structural values’; the increase in ‘protection clauses’; the proposals for ‘weighting clauses’, ‘identity’, ‘hierarchy’ and
‘compensation’ guarantees; the constitutional development of ‘operational
rules’; and the extension of fundamental rights thank to ‘rules governing
the applicable law’.2
There was no formal mention of constitutionalized social rights until
the Mexican (1917) and Weimar (1919) Constitutions, which were created according to a series of political, economic and ideological factors
adapted to the industrial and post-industrial age. The precursors are von
Stein (Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung, 1850) and his doctrinal mentor
Heller (Rechtsstaat oder Diktatur, 1929). The Basic Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany of 1949, a little later, is also worth highlighting
because it includes the idea of the social State (articles 20 and 28), with
demands linked to objectives that increase the reach of liberal States based
on the rule of law, guaranteeing ‘freedom’, ‘property’, ‘equality’, ‘legal security’, and ‘rights of political participation’. In this scheme, the public
authorities are responsible for providing the citizens with the means which
individuals need to develop their personalities and integrate socially, eliminating abstentionism.3
The actions of the State have to be directed towards ensuring individual
freedom and protecting the autonomous development of subjects. The State
organization and its regulation have to be governed by rational principles,
which can be transferred to the law as a basic element. As a result, this
system tries to ensure that the State and its organs can only act in accordance with the powers granted them by the legal system, by which they are
thus limited. In this way, legislation applies to all on an equal basis and
arbitrariness in public powers is eliminated.
1)
2)
3)

Barcellona 1999, p. 105; Tuori 2000, p. 22.
Häberle 2003, p. 108.
Díaz 1998, pp. 103, 106; García-Pelayo 1996, pp. 18–20.
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In addition, it should be stressed that fundamental rights form an essential nucleus within Rules of law in a broad sense, and also constitute an
essential legitimizing element, whilst demanding and requiring such a Rule
of law. In this way, since the end of the 18th century, the theory of rights
has offered a new form of understanding political power and the dimension of the State.4 According to the liberal theory of fundamental rights,
such rights are an individual’s right to freedom in the face of the State.
The freedom of individuals, from the legal point of view, precedes public
authority, which has to ensure the means and institutions needed for its
legal guarantee. The fundamental rights as rights to liberty are rules for the
distribution of competences between individuals (society) and the State.
They delimit the sphere in which individuals and their social structures can
be trusted to regulate conduct and organize their own maintenance.5
The liberal concept of rights has its main corollary in Locke’s statement:
“The greatest and principal aim which men seek when joining a State or
communities, and submitting to a government, is to safeguard their goods”.6
These goods belong to all men in an equal way, so that we can say that they
are individual. They consist of life, liberty and property. The natural order
unfolds in a set of innate and inviolable rights, and the State has been
constituted to protect them. It has to adopt the most suitable organic
structure possible, so that civil rights are the ideal framework for defending
the sphere of individual sovereignty against any interference by the public
sphere. Authors such as Bentham, Locke, Mill, Constant and Tocqueville
stressed negative freedom, placing great importance on protection from
the State, of a more or less radical nature according to each theory. For the
neo-liberal tradition, represented by Buchanan, Friedman, Hayek, Nozick,
Posner and Tullock, the most important point is individual freedom conditioned by the freedom of the market, and defined as an instrument of
convergence between efficiency and justice. In this way, the role of the
State is reduced to that of an arbiter, laying down protective or repressive
rules, and making use of sanctions in the case of non-compliance. When
there is a conjunction of legal freedom, the right not to be interfered with
by the State, and the competence to exercise the right, the State cannot
interfere with liberty.7 Thus the legal, economic and political arguments
4)
5)
6)
7)

De Asís 1999, p. 43; Martínez de Pisón 1997, pp. 31, 32.
Böckenförde 1993, p. 48.
Locke 1982, 9, § 124.
Harvey 2005, pp. 64–87.
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are articulated in a cohesive fashion, postulating an extremely restricted
role for the State.8
According to this theory, in a liberal rule of law, not only is negative
liberty what defines individual autonomy, but equality also becomes more
important, at least in one of its aspects, since there is no doubt that the
concept of equality and its practice are connected with fundamental rights:
those of liberty (since they are rights to equality with respect to possible
differences) and those of society (since they are rights to the reduction of
inequalities). With regard to this, Mill stated:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do
or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.9

Thus if there is an essential equality between all men, based on equal rights
from birth, one can distinguish from this a formal equality or equality before
the law, which is linked to a generality and abstraction, separate from personal, social and economic conditions which may originate from differences in the effective enjoyment of rights and freedoms which are regulated
by law. This equality which establishes legal certainty, is given practical
form in the application of the law, an impartial application of legal criteria
to those who are objects of the rule of law, and in the content of the law,
relative to the justification and reasonableness of the criteria used legally to
differentiate between individuals.
Liberalism aims to justify this equality on the premises from which its
theory is constructed, i.e. from legal equality which is proof of a normative
individualism. Accordingly, individuals are the subjects of legislation; and
of an ethical individualism, which explains that they are in some way rational and capable of having plans for their lives, interests, and other pursuits,
and that the satisfaction of these properties is a value.10 The role which
the State has to play corresponds to a neutrality in the face of individual

8)
9)
10)

Martínez de Pisón 1996, pp. 242–244.
Mill 2003, pp. 57–74.
Rivera 1997, pp. 26 and 27.
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preferences, and the fundamental idea that liberties require an equal treatment for all subjects, men and women, rests on the concept of autonomy.
2. Arguments for Social Rights
A legal guarantee is a functional, relational and multidimensional reality
that can be analysed within a legal system. As far as social rights are concerned, it is necessary to distinguish between the possibilities of technical
and political realization. Technically they can be guaranteed, because the
acts required to satisfy them would inevitably be discretional, unable to be
formalized and would not be susceptible to jurisdictional controls and
constraints. For that reason, the complexity of guaranteeing social rights is
essentially political. Ferrajoli talks of ‘primary guarantees,’ of prohibitions
and obligations that go hand in hand with the rights and, similarly, of the
relationships that exist between what is permitted and what is prohibited,
and between what is permitted and what is not compulsory. 11 The ‘secondary
guarantees’ are related to the responsibilities of the judicial organs to apply
sanctions or declare annulments, if there are invalid or illegal acts that
infringe the obligations or prohibitions that constitute the primary guarantees. In this way, the question of guarantees means that there are rights
with a greater degree of resistance than others depending on what the
authorities have decided. Guastini12 even goes so far as to talk of ‘real rights’
and ‘presumed rights’.
The rights serve to limit the official authority in order to add to its definition and to obtain the support and help it offers in the form of benefits
and services. In relation to civil society they serve to defend its members
from the official authority and from themselves, to be effective and surpass
the natural state, to communicate and establish links between the official
authority and the civil society, instead of having the official authority separated from society or a civil society that does not consider the official
authority. In short, the purpose of the entire public service must be to
ensure the enjoyment of rights and promote them.13 We draw the conclusion that the actions of the State which we have set out should be modernized and improved constantly, because, given the growing scarcity of many
11)
12)
13)

Ferrajoli 2005, pp. 19–56 y 139–196.
Guastini 1994, pp. 133–134.
Peces-Barba 1999b, pp. 131–155.
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goods and having achieved universal social rights, in many cases the demands
are excessive and impossible to meet. Given the problems that arise when
determining when someone is entitled to State’s action, the decision-making
becomes increasingly more complicated.14
The contemporary concept of equality has its origin in the creation of
a legal and social order in which the independence of the individual could
only be obtained by positioning it under the auspices of the legal power
of the State, with the concept of independence being linked to a formal
system and economic autonomy. As Rosenfeld highlights, the history of
constitutional equality is the result of a long and difficult struggle against
feudal status and privileges. This is a dialectical struggle divided into three
stages. In the first, difference is a correlate of inequality: “Those who are
characterized as different are treated as inferiors or superiors depending on
their position in the hierarchy”. In the second phase, identity is a correlate
of equality: “If certain criteria are met, everyone has the right to be treated
equally”. Finally, difference is the correlate: “Any person shall be treated in
proportion to their needs and aspirations”.15
Initially, social rights can be defined as those which establish a benefit or
service for holders of the right. The benefit comes mainly from the public
authorities but also less commonly from individuals.16 They take the form
of rights to substantive equality, i.e. they demand a legal system which
differentiates according to real inequality, so that this equality is a condition of the exercise of fundamental rights.17 Given this aim, the problems
related to guarantees of satisfying these rights differ from those of other
classes of rights.18 In this respect, Bovero believes that, neither the constitutionalization nor internationalization of fundamental rights can be reduced
to theoretical declarations based only on a rigorous distinction between
them and on their safeguarding.19 The contradiction between the declaration and the rights themselves must be resolved, in order to determine the
proper system for guaranteeing the rights.
Donati 1990, pp. 51–81; Eekelaar 2000, pp. 9–28.
Rosenfeld 1996, pp. 161–192.
16)
Prieto points out (1998, pp. 72, 73) that this does not always occur, since by its nature,
the rights to strike and trade union freedom do not involve any provision, unless the public
protection offered for them is considered a provision. Other cases would be those related to
those rights which restrict individual autonomy in employment contracts.
17)
Ollero 1989, p. 14.
18)
Ferrajoli 2007, pp. 108, 109.
19)
Bovero 2007, p. 229.
14)
15)
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This indicates how pernicious it is if society regulates itself freely: administrative, economic, decisional, etc., techniques are essential to break the
autonomy of the systems of State and society. This connection should be
grounded in the development or control of systems without which one
cannot live today, the security of those aspects which are vital for human
life, and a range of social benefits which are guaranteed constitutionally.
The social benefits can be summarized as follows:
1. regulation of a minimum wage, revised according to changes in the
economic situation; a policy of full employment.
2. care for people who are temporarily or permanently incapacitated for
work.
3. career training, supported by a fair distribution of income according
to the economic situation.20
The term ‘social policy’ refers to the institutionalized mechanisms of public
authorities, or preferential guidelines which frame State responsibility for
the welfare of its citizens historically and structurally.21 In this respect, using
the arguments of Barcellona to deepen our understanding of equality, there
is a link between the transformation of the liberal idea of a State governed
by the rule of law and the crisis of formal equality, together with the arrival
of democracy as a substantive principle and procedure. Barcellona comments that substantial inequalities make substantive equality necessary,
even though there is only the barest outline of a differentiated treatment of
actual situations. The criticism which he makes is that “the principle of
substantive equality is the negation of positive law and therefore, of the
self-created character of imposed rules, precisely because it brings with it a
reference to criteria of substantive justice and meta-positive elements” . . .
“It is no coincidence that equality is a form of rule (equal right) and substantive content of the mandate (equality of different situations). Nor is it
a coincidence that formal equality (as a means) should exclude the relevance of substantive inequality, and vice versa, that substantial equality (as
an end) should violate formal equality . . . Paradoxically, equality has to
negate diversity (hierarchies) but should also prevent homologation (the
homogenized society). Its duty is to square the circle”.22
20)
García-Pelayo 2005, pp. 21–25, 29, 30, in terms of the content of ‘existential provision’
defined by Forsthoff.
21)
Garrido 2007, p. 111.
22)
Barcellona 1996, pp. 52, 74.
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Linked to the main discussions which add the satisfaction of social rights
and programmes of substantive equality, numerous solutions have been
designed by various authors. Preuss systematizes the strategies into four
groups: The first suppresses distributive rights, which are a handicap for
the market to use its function of assignation. This proposal is not admissible because the results would restore the hegemony of the bourgeoisie
and run the risk of subjecting the working class to the market, making
political dictatorship a real possibility. The second lays bare the conversion
of substantive rights into procedural rights, prejudicial to persons who
are not capable of pursuing their interests effectively because of lack of
resources. The third is linked to what has been called ‘responsible right’,
contained in article 18 of the German Grundesetz, which determines the
loss of constitutional rights involved in an inappropriate use, i.e. a use
which takes no account of the negative derivations of the constitutional
system as a whole, which could devaluate legal claims. The fourth pertains
to the ‘teubnerian doctrine’ of ‘reflexive law’ which calls for a constitutionalization of an organizing conscience of organizations in response to social
demands.23
3. A New Comprehension of Equality for the Realization of Social
Rights
There is a basic legal equality to which we are all subjects in law, with corresponding rights and obligations. Formal equality is linked to generality and
abstraction. Applied to rights, this means that we are all equal in terms of
holding and exercising rights. The idea of formal justice satisfies the value
of equality in the way that subjects to whom rules are applied have to adapt
to them. The fact that this equality is relative, depending on the criterion
that has inspired the rule in question, the number of advantages or disadvantages to distribute, and the number of persons affected by the rule, does
not alter the fact that compliance with results in equal treatment.24
Equality as a starting point is identified with formal equality, which
runs into obstacles which are indirectly protected by law, resulting from
wealth or chance, which make persons with the same capacity have unequal
opportunities. Legal equality is indispensable for acquiring real equality in
a negative sense, given that the concurrence of legal discriminations limit
23)
24)

Preuss 1991, pp. 88, 89.
Bobbio 2001, pp. 17, 18; Laporta 1985, pp. 3–31.
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the objectives which have been set. At the same time, in a positive sense, it
allows persons to go before the courts to challenge discrimination. However, formal equality is not sufficient. It requires an effective application of
egalitarian laws and laws which safeguard vulnerable areas: the principle of
‘social equalization’ compensates inequalities by raising or promoting disadvantaged people, or limiting or reducing the wealth and power of the
most fortunate. The former case offers positive benefits, and the latter negative ones.25
Given the idiosyncratic nature of equality and the fact that it starts with
diversity, its evaluation excludes identity and similarity. Identity deals with
two distinct subjects, and does not recognize elements which differ. Similarity does not require differentiating elements to be disregarded. When we
make a judgement regarding equality, we have to make a relational operation, making clear that something is equal to another thing with which we
are comparing it. This point involves a value judgement which considers
certain facts and inherent inferences.26 A case of equality of treatment
would be when A and B are treated equally by C, if C gives the same benefit or specific detriment to A and B. Whether A and B receive an equal
distribution depends on the rule applied. The principle can be broken
down into the obligation which the legal system has to prevent a priori any
form of negative discrimination becoming positive, and implanting positive discrimination on cases which have traditionally involved situations of
inequality. In this respect, it is interesting to mention the opinion of Ruiz
Miguel relating to relative equality rules, determining equal treatment for
a certain category of persons, inasmuch as this treatment is given to another
category, and non-relative equality rules, determining the rights and duties
of various persons without reference to the relationship between them.27
In substantive equality, affirmative and negative judgements of equality
are not absolutely symmetrical. The fact that two individuals, or classes of
individuals, are substantially equal is interpreted as a duty to treat them in
the same way. It is a legal policy directive aimed at legislators or judges.
According to Guastini, this presupposition can be formulated as a normative proposition within the terms given as follows: “There is at least one
rule which attributes to ‘x’ and ‘y’ distinct subjective legal situations”. The
statement that two individuals, or classes of individuals, are not substan25)
26)
27)

Fernández Ruiz-Gálvez 1992, pp. 156–158.
Prieto 1995, pp. 112–115.
Santamaría 1997, p. 295.
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tially equal is made according to the circumstances and the context of the
discourse. We can use a principle holding to this postulate to express the
guideline that there has to be different treatment, and to express that
the subjects, or a group of them, should be made equal.28
The question which has to be addressed is what the foundation for substantive equality in the discourse of social rights is. The answer has to be
rooted in the response to human needs, which are either themselves not
negotiable, or are based on circumstances which are not negotiable, and
which signify a manifestation of the capacity to overcome the limits of
their existence.29 Those who do not have their basic needs guaranteed have
the satisfaction of these needs protected in the form of rights.30 Graphically, Zimmerling argues that “N is a basic need for x if, and only if,, under
the circumstances given in the socio-cultural system S in which he lives
and given the personal qualities P of x, the non-satisfaction of N prevents
x from carrying out any non-contingent goal, and thus from following his
overall life plan”. To sum up, a human need is identified by the damage
which its non-satisfaction produces for the person.31
The techniques of dealing with equality of substantive treatment are
equality as ‘equivalence’ and as ‘differentiation’. The former deals with
the respect and protection of basic needs as an element whose rationality
and foundation for rights is entirely acceptable. The latter consists in the
disappearance of a privilege within its estimation as a fundamental right,
insofar as: it is interpretable as equality of substantive treatment as equivalence, since the differential circumstance is not relevant for creating an
inequality; it establishes a civil right which obliges the public authorities
to satisfy a need which cannot be satisfied by privation; and it determines
principles that demand to be dealt with later by legislation.32 On this
subject, we wonder what distribution leads to adequate compensation,
given that meeting point between the legal equality defined in legislation
and the action of public authorities to achieve substantive equality is
far from clear. As Gíménez Glück points out, it is difficult to be precise
on “when the principle of equality is being complied with”, “when formal
equality is transgressed in order to achieve substantive equality”, or “when
28)
29)
30)
31)
32)

Guastini 1999, pp. 196–198.
Añón 1994, pp. 191, 193.
Añón 1994, pp. 265, 266; Contreras 1994, pp. 52–54.
Zimmerling 1990, p. 51; Bayón 1991, pp. 43–45; Martínez de Pisón 1998, p. 166.
Añón and García Añón 2002, pp. 153, 154; Peces-Barba 1999a, p. 291.
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the traditional outlines of formally equal treatment is being respected
scrupulously”.33
Thus it is worth outlining the grey area between “differences” (characteristics which differentiate and at the same time make persons individuals)
and “inequalities” (disparities between subjects originating in rights related
to wealth and positions of power or subjection). Despite discrepancies, we
note that the two concepts, “differences,” and “inequalities,” are linked to
the fundamental rights of liberty, in terms of the equal respect to all differences, and to social rights, in terms of the rights to reduction of inequality.34
These are the reasons for which Rawls insists that the “basic structure of
society should be organized in such a way that the inequalities in obtaining
the primary goods of welfare, income, power and authority should be
aimed at producing the greatest benefit for the least advantaged in obtaining
primary goods”.
This implies that equality carries with it diversity. As an illustration,
L. Hierro, following Haussman and McPherson, discusses equality of welfare, equality of resources or primary goods, equality of opportunities for
welfare, equality of capacity and complex equality.35 From the progressive
liberal perspective, Rawls bases his argument on a concept of justice applied
to the basic structure of the political and social system, and associates it
with two principles: a) that “each person participating in a practice, or
affected by it, has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible
with a like liberty for all”. and b) “inequalities (as permitted and defined
by the pattern of distribution of rights and duties) are arbitrary unless it is
reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone’s advantage and
provided the positions and offices to which they attach, or from which
they may be gained, are open to all”.36 Rawls’ plan is “to maximize the
autonomy of each individual separately insofar it does not imply putting
other individuals in a position of less comparative autonomy”. For Nino,
this reinforces the principle of personal dignity: the attribution of equal
value to agreement between normal and adult individuals presupposes an
equivalence between the possibilities of choice. Thus satisfaction of priGiménez Glück 1999, pp. 52, 53.
Ferrajoli 2006, pp. 82, 83. One should not confuse ‘difference’ with ‘inequality’. In this
duality equality is based on diversity, which is opposed to ‘homogeneity’ and ‘identity’ (De
Lucas 2000, p. 493). See also Añón Roig 2001.
35)
Hierro 2002, p. 96.
36)
Rawls 2001, pp. 104, 105.
33)
34)
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mary goods determines individual well-being.37 The work Political Liberalism not only introduces elements of justice, but also the objective basis for
comparing individual situations of well-being between citizens.38
Dworkin presents an alternative of equality of resources, in a much less
flexible position. Dworkin maintains that “given that liberal equality depends
on economic and political mechanisms which reveal the real costs of opportunity of impersonal resources, an egalitarian society must be a free society.
Invasions of liberty, such as criminal legislation which prohibits activities
or styles of life that some people may wish to live or carry out, constitute
invasions of equality, unless the need for them is justifiable, to protect an
egalitarian distribution of resources and opportunities, providing security
for persons or property, or for some other reason”.39
According to Rawls and Dworkin, what is important is that there should
be equality in satisfying basic needs allowing all persons to act as moral
agents within a context, with an index which would postulate as a minimum that “justice would demand to satisfy all equally”. Believing that no
action which increased the distance from this minimum postulate would
be justified, although equality could increase overall, the principle of difference would justify all kinds of actions which would take place and bring
closer to the absolute minimum people who were at a lower level, despite
the fact that the package of measures adopted represented a greater inequality.
L. Hierro argues that if justice and effectiveness are related, it would have
to be seen if it is possible to set a limit according to the satisfaction of the
basic needs of the most advantaged members of society.40
The formula “for any good X, the just method of distribution consists in
dividing X into equal parts” is a summary of egalitarianism, and enhances
the rules of “to each the same” and “to all equally”. The criticism made is
that, bearing in mind that equal distribution is not always just, a distribution which allows the exercise of equal rights is just given the problem
of shortage of goods. It corrects the preceding axioms through the joint
maxims that “everyone has a right to a minim level of life, and the goods
should be distributed in such a way that equal rights are satisfied”, according
to the concepts of ‘minimum level of life’, ‘quality of life’, ‘basic needs’ and
Nino 1989, pp. 345, 346.
On the commentary of the work of Rawls 2005, see J. Martínez de Pisón 1998, pp. 152,
153.
39)
Dworkin 1993, pp. 89, 90; Dworkin 2000, pp. 75–131.
40)
Hierro 2002, pp. 96–99, 102.
37)
38)
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‘levels of life’.41 To define substantive equality between individualism and
collectivism as a basis for social rights, we have to maintain that it is
based on ‘equality to achieve a goal’. Substantive equality, and equality
of substantive treatment, aspires to moral liberty, without forgetting the
proper use of social, political and legal liberty and the rights which are
based on it.42
In the words of Prieto Sanchís, the achievement of real equality by legal
differentiations or inequalities is not obtained only through benefits. In
addition, as we explained above, to know if something is equal it must be
valued in relation to something else, using criteria which explain whether
there are reasons for a different treatment. The key lies in deciding which
real inequalities are arguable, and whether they are important enough to
represent a sufficient reason when it comes to different treatment.43
4. Final Note
To sum up, understanding social rights is a dynamic and complex question. This complexity can be seen in the role played within the traditional
decision-making powers governed by rules of exclusive and excluding competences. To this scheme can be added civil society and international
bodies which create and strengthen new relations.44 Following J.S. Mill
and Bentham, distributive justice is summarized according to the statement: “Between various possible distributions, a just distribution is that
which proportions the greatest happiness possible to the greatest number
of people”. The problems arise because there are situations which oppose
equality and which are not solved by utilitarianism; there are also inevitable inconveniences in an economic system in which supply and demand
play a decisive role.45
We accept the defining argument of L. Hierro on equality, saying that
“there has to be adequate resources among all human beings to satisfy basic
needs, leaving each to develop his life plan in a similarly autonomous and
free way”.46 The tension between equality in practice and in law gives rise
41)
42)
43)
44)
45)
46)

Bobbio 1976, pp. 321–330.
Peces-Barba 1999a, pp. 289, 290; D. Giménez Glück 1999, pp. 45, 46.
Prieto 1998, pp. 81, 84, 90.
Barcellona 1996, p. 23.
Quintana 1994, p. 30–35.
Hierro 1995, p. 137.
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to a clash between principles. The problems that arise from these contradictions between theory and practice should be resolved using the techniques of deliberation. In answer to the question whether there is a general
rule of preference, the answer lies in equality and not in differentiation.
“There is always a reason for equality. Thus equality should be proposed so
long as some real inequality does not offer a reason allowing or, depending
on the conflicting arguments, imposing a differentiating regulation”.47
There is a complementarity between equal opportunities and the achievement of substantial equality which justifies differentiated treatment as long
as there is social inequality, so that minority groups do not remain marginalized.48 The transcendent importance of health, food, education, housing
and culture is clear and manifest. At other times there are needs whose
relevance does not seem so clear.49 In this case, Jori is right when he suggests that equality in legal capacity consists of “equal capacity to arrive at
being unequal,” as a way of putting into action “liberty as autonomy”. As
a footnote, the right to become and continue to be owner or debtor creates
its guarantees related to the protection and ethical nature of the right to
property or credit. The frontiers between fundamental and ownership
rights have yet to be defined.50
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